Om Charan Amatya*
From Japan’s military expansion and the Korean Peninsula to Tibet, India and the Himalayan frontier, a new Asian strategic equation is taking shape—and Nepal cannot afford to misread it.
Asia is entering a period of profound strategic transformation. Developments that once appeared unrelated are increasingly converging: Japan is rapidly expanding its military capabilities; the United States is recalibrating aspects of its military commitments in South Korea; North Korea is deepening its military ties with Russia; India is becoming increasingly assertive; and the Tibet question is once again attracting attention.
Adding another dimension to this changing security landscape is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, with the possibility of Bangladesh and Egypt joining the arrangement. Whatever its ultimate shape, this emerging security framework deserves Nepal’s attention—not because Nepal is directly involved, but because any developments in South Asia can have indirect consequences for our own strategic environment. Individually, none of these developments necessarily signals an imminent confrontation. Collectively, however, they point to a rapidly changing strategic environment around Nepal.
Situated between the two Asian giants—India and China—while maintaining growing relations with the United States, Japan, Europe, and the immediate neighbours such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, Nepal needs exceptional diplomatic caution.
The unexpected arrival of relief materials following the devastating Bhotekoshi floods of August 26 naturally has a humanitarian dimension. But Nepal should also keep its eyes wide open to their possible geopolitical and strategic implications, just as it witnessed in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes.
A Changing East Asian Security Environment
Japan’s transformation deserves particular attention. After decades of maintaining a restrained security posture under its pacifist constitution, Tokyo is expanding its defence capabilities and military expenditure in response to perceived threats from China and North Korea. Its proposed defence budget for fiscal 2027 is expected to reach roughly 8.9 trillion yen (US$ 57.06 billion).
Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes are adding to the changing security scenario in the region. Its 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia, including a mutual-defence commitment, has added a wider Eurasian dimension to the Korean security equation.
The US–South Korea relationship presents another paradox. Washington has reduced or cancelled some elements of major military exercises, raising questions about the future shape and reliability of its commitments. At the same time, the United States, South Korea and Japan continue to strengthen trilateral military cooperation. Military cooperation in East Asia is therefore being reduced in some areas, reorganised in others and expanded elsewhere—all at the same time.
Though the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, sometimes described as an “Islamic NATO,” has no direct connection with Nepal, the way India is viewing the emerging alignment—with Pakistan and Türkiye playing important roles—could have repercussions that we, as Nepalese, simply cannot afford to ignore.
Tibet: Humanitarian and Strategic Sensitivities
For Nepal, Tibet is particularly sensitive. The catastrophe along Nepal’s northern border on August 26 once again demonstrated how closely the Himalayan environment connects Nepal and Tibet. The disaster also prompted humanitarian reactions from Tibetan leaders in exile. Such humanitarian reactions should not automatically be interpreted as political activity. At the same time, Nepal must recognise that Tibet remains a core security concern for China.
Nepal has consistently maintained that its territory will not be used for activities directed against either of its neighbours. This is a key pillar of our foreign relations and serves Nepal’s broader national interests. With this very principle in mind, Nepal should neither become a platform for anti-China activity nor dismiss legitimate humanitarian concerns as geopolitical conspiracy. At the same time, Nepal should have the confidence to further consolidate friendly government-to-government and people-to-people relations with countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Diplomatic maturity lies precisely in maintaining this delicate balance.
India’s Growing Assertiveness
India is becoming an increasingly confident regional power, possessing enormous economic, military, diplomatic and geographical influence.
For Nepal, however, India’s rise has a special dimension. India has, until now, been Nepal’s principal economic and transit partner. The two countries share an open border and deep social and cultural connections, while India provides Nepal with vital access to international markets. But as India pursues greater global ambitions, it should also reconsider the way it views and treats its smaller neighbours—particularly Nepal.
The adverse environment developing around India in its immediate neighbourhood cannot help its aspiration to become a truly global power. The political changes witnessed in Bangladesh in 2024 and Nepal in 2025, Bangladesh’s apparent interest in the Mecca arrangement, and the setbacks India experienced during Operation Sindoor should all serve as important signals.
If India wants to mitigate the growing anti-Indian sentiment in its neighbourhood—much of which, rightly or wrongly, is being attributed to India itself—it must begin treating its neighbours as equals, even while recognising the obvious differences in size, population and power. In Nepal’s case, it may also be time for both countries to have a serious conversation about the future of the open border, including the possibility of introducing passport-based entry arrangements.
Such a step would undoubtedly require careful consideration of its enormous social, economic and cultural consequences. But for the long-term benefit of both countries, the broader objective should remain clear: a relationship based on mutual respect, sovereign equality and predictable interdependence.
As India and China both seek to influence Nepal’s strategic orientation, their competition for influence here is likely to intensify. Against this backdrop, Nepal’s new and youth-dominated government has an opportunity—and a responsibility—to take initiatives that can position Nepal intelligently within the emerging global order through a balanced and independent foreign policy.
Nepal’s Strategic Geography
Nepal is more than a small, landlocked country situated between two giants. It occupies one of Asia’s most sensitive strategic locations. China and the Tibetan Plateau lie to the north; India and the vast Indo-Gangetic plain to the south; the Indian Ocean lies beyond India; and the increasingly militarised Indo-Pacific stretches further east.
The Himalayas contain vital rivers, fragile ecosystems, pilgrimage routes and potential transportation corridors. Nepal therefore sits at the intersection of security, water, climate, connectivity, trade and geopolitics. Its strategic importance is likely to grow as competition among India, China and the United States intensifies.
Nepal Should Not Choose a Strategic Camp
Nepal will increasingly face pressure to lean towards one side or another. Some may argue that Nepal should move closer to India and the West to counter China. Others may advocate closer alignment with Beijing to resist American and Indian influence. Given Nepal’s extraordinarily sensitive geopolitical location, both approaches could be catastrophic. Nepal needs friends, not patrons; partnerships, not dependency.
This does not mean maintaining equal distance from every country. Nepal’s relationships with its immediate neighbours, India and China, are structurally different from those with distant powers. The appropriate principle is therefore strategic autonomy, not strategic isolation.
Nepal should cooperate with every country—including Bangladesh and Pakistan—according to its own national interests.
What Should Nepal Do?
First, maintain the One-China policy firmly.
Nepal should assure China that Nepali territory will not be used against Chinese interests while retaining its sovereign right to maintain normal relations with all countries.
Second, deepen economic relations with India without excessive dependence.
India will remain indispensable because of geography. But dependence should gradually evolve into interdependence through greater hydropower exports, diversified trade routes and improved access to alternative markets. To maintain a healthy strategic balance, Nepal should also retain the sovereign freedom to diversify its energy and petroleum sources, including the possibility of importing a significant share of its petroleum requirements from China. Such diversification would strengthen Nepal’s bargaining position and reduce excessive dependence on any single source.
Third, develop meaningful connectivity with China.
Chinese connectivity can help diversify Nepal’s transit options. But infrastructure projects must be assessed on the basis of economic viability, debt sustainability, transparency and Nepal’s national interest—not geopolitical excitement.
Fourth, keep the United States and Western countries engaged.
Cooperation in education, technology, health, climate, disaster management and development can bring substantial benefits to Nepal without turning the country into a strategic outpost of any external power.
Fifth, strengthen relations with Japan.
Japan’s importance should not be viewed only through a military lens. One of Nepal’s oldest friends, it remains an important source of technology, investment, infrastructure expertise and development assistance.
Sixth, make Himalayan climate diplomacy a strategic priority.
The recent disaster should be a wake-up call. Nepal needs stronger mechanisms for sharing hydrological, meteorological and glacial information with both China and India. As climate change accelerates, climate diplomacy may ultimately become as important to Nepal’s security as traditional diplomacy.
The Real Balance: Geopolitics and National Interest
Nepal must also prevent foreign powers from becoming instruments of domestic political competition. If one political force becomes “pro-India,” another “pro-China” and another “pro-West,” Nepal’s foreign policy risks becoming hostage to domestic politics.
India is not Nepal’s enemy. China is not Nepal’s enemy. Nepal should respect the legitimate security concerns of both, provided that they, in turn, respect Nepal’s sovereignty and legitimate national interests.
The United States and Japan, too, are close friends of Nepal. But friendship should not mean that Nepal becomes anyone’s unquestioning strategic ally. The real danger is not choosing the wrong friend. It is losing the ability to choose independently.
From Buffer State to Bridge State
Nepal was once commonly described as a buffer between India and China. That concept belongs to another era. In the changing global context, Nepal should aspire to become a bridge rather than a buffer—a bridge between South Asia and China, between the Himalayas and the Indo-Gangetic plain, and a hub for tourism, energy, trade and culture.
Potentially, Nepal could also serve as a bridge for dialogue between competing Asian powers. But Nepal cannot become a credible bridge if it is perceived as an instrument of one power against another. Its foreign policy should therefore rest on sovereignty, strategic autonomy, balanced engagement, economic diversification, non-alignment in military conflicts and friendship with all.
In the coming years, Nepal’s greatest diplomatic asset may not be military strength. It may be the ability to say: “We are friends with everyone, enemies with none, and aligned only with our national interest.” For a country situated at one of Asia’s most sensitive strategic crossroads, that is not weakness. It may be the very definition of strength.
* Om Charan Amatya is the Founding Chairperson, Center for Asian Studies (CAS)—Bhaktapur; Creative Head, Nepal Public Media Network; Executive Director, Heritage Movies-Nepal; and Founding Chairperson, Organ Donors’ Association-Nepal (ODA-N).
